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1. Introduction 
My aim is to discuss the appearance of political elements and structures in everyday situations, 
in relation to aesthetics. I do this from a philosophical perspective, i.e. I ask for the significance 
of political aesthetics including implications of this notion. This requires beginning with an 
explanation as to what both the terms political and aesthetics signify. 
Concerning aesthetics, I will make use of a tradition from A. G. Baumgarten where the 
term aesthetics is applied as a type of cognition. Aesthetics is about perception rather than 
characterisations of art and attitudes towards it, such as aesthetic appreciation and experienc-
es. It is about a particular aspect of perception, the sensorial. This sensorial aspect of percep-
tion means that perception in the following paper is sense-perception; however, I will not add 
‘sense’ but emphasise that the sensorial aspect of perception concerns not only what we per-
ceive but more important how we perceive. 
To perceive is to distinguish between impressions, enabling an understanding because we 
identify something as something—we learn where to look and what to look for in order to orient 
ourselves in the world. Perceiving is not a mere receptive faculty collecting impressions but an 
active, discriminative attention directed towards what we intend to react to and engage in. This 
active component explains why Baumgarten defined aesthetics as sensorial cognition: It is about 
how the senses exercise these discriminations, hence it is a cognitive activity, i.e. a deliberate and 
intentional act. A crucial part of sensorial cognition is then related to how we have acquired the 
capacity to discriminate, which implies we have received guidance and training in how to do it. 
Such guidance and training is education; as it concerns a training of the sensorial aspect of our 
perceptual faculty, called aesthetics, I call this training aesthetic education. It is important not to 
confuse aesthetic education with an education in making judgements about aesthetic artefacts, 
nor with the formation (Bildung) of a character educated in ideals of culture. I focus on what 
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comes before any discussion of the content of any educational curriculum; focus is on the pro-
cess of training perception and not on the end result of this education. 
By aesthetic education I thus refer to a line of different sensorial experiences which have 
been considered elements in education, like theatre, dance, and music in a Western tradition 
have been considered elements in education. Such elements represent a crucial meeting point 
between the particularity of the senses and the generality of the spirit, and the goal of education 
is to abandon the particularity of oneself to become a member of a community.1 The process of 
leaving the particular requires means for affecting and forming our senses and feelings enabling 
us to act as member of a community. Among these sensorial means one particular group steals 
the attention: the arts and consequently discourses in aesthetics become often exclusively about 
them. I wish to keep focus on any artefacts as they are all responsible for affecting and training 
our senses and perception. The training of the sensorial and bodily elements of our relation to 
the world is to be considered as material and efficient causes of the education. This is in contrast 
to the ideals and goals of the education—the formal and final causes. When perception is under-
stood to be more than the direction of attention towards the identification of something as some-
thing, and it implies being affected in more ways, then we should investigate how we relate to 
and are subject to such influences exercised on us by the environment. 
The concept of aesthetics must be related to an understanding of education where, 
throughout Western traditions, participation in plays and processions as well as training in 
disciplines such as dance, fencing, and piano playing has been considered to be essential for 
forming individuals to become members of a community. This is not about becoming an excel-
lent dancer or piano player but about exercises which develop senses and bodies that we may 
perform along with others. Learning to dance is, apart from being able to dance, also to learn 
how to be bodily present in particular situations. Being present and being present in a particu-
lar way also has an effect on how we perceive ourselves and the situation we are in. Such bodily 
training is hence an element in the educational forming of the individual’s perceptual skills 
and consequently of the mind. Hegel can explain: “This year we have brought a highly recom-
mended teaching into practice... the military drill of high school’s upper class. This drill—
which involves quick perception, being present with one’s senses, executing a command with-
out wavering in thought, and adjusting one’s position with precision—is the most direct means 
against the mind’s sluggishness and distraction.”2 
In this aspect of perceptual education lies an element of power. Here I follow Steven 
Lukes in the belief that power is not about decision making and the execution of interests im-
posed directly on others, but a more complex set of relations influencing how we act.3 This in-
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fluence is a result of any exchange and interaction between people and with cultural artefacts 
and their organisation. 
Through examples of changes in our relation to the world due to economic structures that 
influence our perception of, for instance, privacy and gender, I will point at how this training of our 
perception concerns how we perceive rather than what we perceive and that this has consequenc-
es for our relation to the world as such. I argue that aesthetics is a key-discipline for characterising 
the training of our perception and for the importance of becoming aware of elements of power 
embedded in this training of our perception which is what I call political aesthetics. 
 
2. What is Political Aesthetics? 
My use of the term political aesthetics bears a parallel to the term political economy i.e. econ-
omy on the scale of society and its different institutions of law and governing, in contrast to 
economy concerned with specific areas such as individuals and firms, also known as microeco-
nomics. Political economy is a notion that originates in 18th century discussions. Today “polit-
ical” has disappeared and in public discourses we usually only talk about “economy.” Adding 
political to aesthetics should likewise emphasize how this perspective on aesthetics concerns 
our sensorial cognitive capacities in relation to the organisation of the environment, in opposi-
tion to being limited to a subjectivist approach that is only concerned with individuals’ reac-
tions and judgements of taste. 
Regarding a subjectivist approach in aesthetics I share Hans-Georg Gadamer’s unease 
about what he terms aesthetic consciousness and separation.4 His concern is that the aesthetic 
experience implies separating a characterisation of the object for aesthetic judgement expressed 
by the individual subject from the context in which the object originates. Likewise, Herbert Mar-
cuse criticises how the term aesthetic in such a separation is used for higher culture and implies 
a divorce of social reality from practice.5 An aesthetic judgement thus becomes a demonstration 
of one’s skills in evaluating particular features recognised by an art-critical audience at the cost 
of communication and education which has the purpose of engaging with life. 
One particular feature is often used in this context: disinterestedness. It has an origin in 
classical metaphysics as the highest intellectual achievement in contemplating the order of the 
world. The classical significance of contemplation was to leave an occupation where we seek 
meaningful answers to concrete problems to instead ask for the meaning of our daily life in 
general. An enterprising modern society will devaluate such a purposeless activity and place it 
outside practice as leisure time. Prominent fields for disinterested contemplation can then be-
come art and aesthetics as separated from practice. Stripped away from their place in the 
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world, they are placed in the museum as objects for disinterested judgements uttered by an 
audience educated in doing so aesthetically. While this could also be considered as liberation 
of art from obligations and rules, many artists have, since the 19th century, struggled with in-
stitutions being built around this idea of aesthetic contemplation and judgement. 
Gadamer’s unease about aesthetic consciousness addresses how the educational inten-
tions of aesthetics, the training of sensorial capacity for discriminating between objects, situa-
tions and people, fail. The ultimate purpose of such an education is a formation (Bildung) of 
the moral character, in brief to transcend one’s individual perspective to develop one’s spirit 
(Geist) and enter humanity. Instead it becomes only an education in performing within specific 
aesthetic discourses for an audience of art-lovers. But someone acquiring expertise in art cri-
tique may not also prove to have a moral character. Gadamer’s concern is similar to what The-
odor Adorno calls “Halbbildung,”6 a formation in which a general perspective on society is lost 
to a narrow focus on particular interests and functions. 
Instead of including education or formation in the title for my article I have used the term 
political, as any educational process will also imply a political element, or influencing others 
through different means. When these means are sensorial they belong to aesthetics and thus we 
need to investigate what elements of power are present in the multiple ways they appear. As I 
said before with reference to political economy, aesthetics should be viewed on the scale of socie-
ty and the elements of powers implied, thus it should be considered a political aesthetics. 
Political aesthetics is also used by Crispin Sartwell as a title for a book of his.7 I share 
his intention of emphasising the significance of the political in a broad sense; where it is about 
aspects of relations we have to people, organisations and institutions. This brings us within 
discussions of ideologies, which he says, we often think of too narrowly as texts, books, consti-
tutions and manifestos.8 If we focus only on the content of these texts our focus become too 
narrow; we should also pay attention to the style they are written in as it also reflects and re-
veals their political ideas. His important suggestion is “that an ideology is an aesthetic system” 
and that “the aesthetic expressions of a regime or of the resistance to a regime are central also 
to the cognitive content and concrete effects of political systems.”9 Aesthetics is not added to 
the political content as a means of communication and persuasion; it is an integrated element 
in how the political appears and is exercised. Furthermore, aesthetics should not be related 
narrowly to political ideologies and explicit discourses and Sartwell’s case studies are instead 
about different cultural forms like punk, black nationalism, Rastafarianism and graffiti. 
Sartwell’s concept of aesthetics, on the other hand, I find too narrow. Very traditionally 
he understands aesthetics to be about “the nature of art; aesthetic values, especially beauty and 
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sublimity; standards of taste and aesthetic assessment; and mimesis or representation.”10 Dif-
ficulties arise when he, for example, gives beauty, which is seen as the object of longing,11 a 
significant role to play. Obviously longing may appear in many contexts and forms such as the 
“rich, strange, mysterious, bewilderingly complex, teeming, or incomprehensible,”12 but it also 
leaves the question of what it is that is rich, strange etc. What is it we are longing for? And 
what enables us to utter biased statements about beauty, like Sartwell does, such as the asser-
tion that the modern bureaucratic state is ugly?13 Our longing can change, he admits, and this 
change is exactly what I would call a change in our sensorial cognition. I would add that such 
changes come about because of changes in the environment that affect us and teach us what 
kind of longing is appropriate where we live. Sartwell here draws, importantly, attention to 
how we should investigate the aesthetic dimension of the environment for ways power appears 
because of a “refusal to distinguish between the content of a political system and its aesthetic 
aspects.”14 However, to use the parallel of the economy above, he remains at the position of 
microeconomics and does not proceed to the wider political implication. The experience of 
beauty, he says, “expresses a set of basic human capacities and dilemmas, something that all 
people seek.”15 But this is exactly the kind of assumption to address so as we can learn what 
general structures precede the concrete forms of political powers and what is inherent in them 
appearing in the environment and forming our perception of it. 
There is help then in what Marcuse calls “radical sensibility.” The concept “stresses the 
active, constitutive role of the senses in shaping reason, that is to say, in shaping the categories 
under which the world is ordered, experienced, changed.”16 He emphasises how perception is 
influenced by society and how this influence is an educational element brought about by the 
organisation of the environment, an organisation which is an appearance of structures of pow-
er. Political aesthetics is about acknowledging the extent to which we are subject to such influ-
ences, not least because they form our perception hence our most fundamental relation to the 
world. Two implications appear for the philosophical interest: One is how far-reaching these 
implications are; another is the legitimacy of our perception. 
The latter is an epistemological question which I will abandon here. In more ways it is 
discussed in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gernot Böhme.17 I do relate to 
them but will not proceed much further into this topic. Instead I will in the next section con-
sider some examples regarding the implications of being embedded in structures of powers 
which form us and perform for us before in the last section discussing how aesthetics as politi-
cal aesthetics offers a critical approach to understanding and acting on these structures. 
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3. Witch-hunting and Aesthetic Economy 
The presence of structures influencing how we act is a necessary condition for living together 
and what I call an appearance of the political as any living together implies politics. Some 
structures are explicit, such as the outcomes of political debates and decisions. So are struc-
tures we are subject to and participate in, such as political institutions and economic condi-
tions; we can actively debate them but we may not always pay attention to them. Finally, there 
are structures we hardly notice which require an effort to be made aware of; we participate in 
them and often become active supporters of them even though we may want to do differently. 
An example is how we relate to what is private and public and how we perceive the difference. 
Such perception is integrated into our behaviour and we pay little or no attention to it except 
when this difference is challenged. Such a challenge may appear in places with a different or-
der from what one is used to, such as when there is a third space between the public and the 
private. Such third spaces in-between private and public can be found in the streets of Islamic 
Middle Eastern cities, even having a name in Arabic, al-fina.18 Those unfamiliar with this third 
space will not perceive it or perhaps be puzzled about something indeterminate in what is only 
perceived to be the public sphere. Such structures are “invisible” because they are embodied in 
how we relate to people and the environment. Precisely because these structures are “invisible” 
or unnoticed they become of interest as they convey ideologies we reproduce despite us wish-
ing to do differently. Here lies the interest in political aesthetics. 
The difference between public and private in Western thinking belongs to the political 
economy. The word economy has a Greek origin, coming from the house, oikos. The house was 
in ancient Greece a private sphere in contrast to the public and political but this differentia-
tion, writes Hannah Arendt, becomes blurred in modern times where we see “the body of peo-
ple and political communities in the image of the family whose everyday affairs have to be tak-
en care of by a nation-wide administration of housekeeping.”19 What is considered private, how 
it is considered, and to what extent it is considered separate from the public and independent 
of it, is throughout history and in different cultural constellations a matter of different political 
ideas and manifestations.20 
It is not to dispute that we have private sensations in the sense that no one has access to 
one’s feelings, but it is of little interest to anyone that I feel something if feelings, passions, and 
sensations are not transformed “into a shape to fit them for public appearance.”21 The moment 
I utter something about my inner state I also make it subject to an interpretation to share. 
Even the fact that I feel something is not that simple, as I also discriminate between many feel-
ings in order to select which to give attention to and share. My exchange with others is, as an 
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exchange, a participation in the public sphere, influenced by and influencing what and how we 
perceive something. No one can deprive me of the feeling of pain, but I am alone in it and it 
has as such in this subjective aspect no particular human side to it, hence it does not character-
ise humanity. Feelings of pain or other bodily irritations do not form the direction for a human 
existence; a hedonistic absence of pain “is but the most radical form of a non-political, totally 
private way of life.”22 Irritation is what disturbs us and throws us back upon ourselves hence it 
is, subjectively, “worldless.” The idea of characterising an understanding of our relation to a 
community based on subjective feelings ignores that these intimate, subjective states only be-
come meaningful in a community. The poet may have the same feelings as I have but will be 
better in translating these feelings into words and help me understand them. However, any 
translation is also an interpretation and may colour and form my view on these feelings. What 
could be seen as a loss of the unique character of the private feeling is also the necessity of any 
human exchange: only through it do I come to an understanding of my feelings and manage to 
leave myself and meet others. 
It is important to understand how our interpretation of ourselves is essential for enabling 
an engagement with others and in return is also formed by others. It is an interpretation based 
on our perception that is trained in and by the social environment, what I referred to earlier as 
aesthetic education. Examples can demonstrate the extent and implication of this education. 
a. One example comes from Silvia Federici’s book about witch-hunting.23 She draws at-
tention to how changes in economic structures from the Middle Ages into emerging capitalism, 
i.e. mainly between the early 15th and late 18th century, also brought about a change in the 
perception of different groups of people, in particular women, with the witch hunts in 16th and 
17th century as the climax. Many elements were included in enabling this form of terror. One 
was the privatisation of what before had been common land, the commons, which served as a 
means of social support for the poor through “access to meadows in which to keep cows, or 
woods in which to gather timber, wild berries and herbs, or quarries, fish-ponds, and open 
spaces in which to meet.”24 The loss of the commons was particularly problematic for women 
who had few alternatives for supporting themselves; it marks one important step amongst oth-
ers in reducing women’s independence.25 
Another element Federici adds is a change in the relation between production and repro-
duction. Reproduction, i.e. maintaining the family’s existence and producing offspring, was a 
necessity that traditionally belonged to the house. In antiquity it was hidden because it was there 
man was “alone with his body, facing the naked necessity to keep himself alive.”26 Necessity was 
considered something we shared with animals, contrary to the public figure who had to be a free 
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human being, i.e. not a slave to necessities.27 In the period of emerging capitalism the household 
became a public affair, however its economic value was not recognised. It remained outside the 
economic system and was considered as being in need of means of control to ensure its subjec-
tion to economically more valuable production. The disappearing of the commons, which had 
given women some independence, contributed to how women, instead of the commons, became 
a means for reproduction and “women themselves became the commons.”28 
These elements were accompanied by a judicial system depriving women of rights, and 
a new understanding of the sciences rejecting older interpretations like magic. Magic was an 
influential scientific tradition in the Renaissance, among the traditions that the scientific revo-
lution in the 17th century would put an end to. But magic included elements such as lucky and 
unlucky days, special powers granted to special people or circumstances which were seen to 
undermine the ideas of and stability expected for a capitalist work-discipline.29 Such challeng-
es to the economic structure were answered by organising particular means such as work-life 
according to a particular work-discipline. This implied a change in perceptions of life and how 
to order it. Disciplines such as magic would be excluded not only by the emerging new sciences 
but also by new ideals of production. Such changes in perception were not about deliberate 
and conscious ways of relating to the world but about transition due to changes in how people 
lived. The case of magic and capitalist work-discipline could be considered an element in 
changing how men viewed women when some specific forms of knowledge practiced by some 
women were then seen as relating to magic now to be excluded and demonised. It thus led to 
structures of controlling these women of which witch-hunting was an extreme form of terror as 
a means of social oppression in the 16th and 17th century. While witch-hunting is the most 
extreme form of controlling women it should be taken as one of many examples which fol-
lowed from an interest in controlling reproduction and introducing different views on what 
was rational and beneficial for the emerging capitalist society. Another form of controlling ap-
pears perhaps less extreme but one can argue it has more extreme consequences—the demon-
ising of female sexuality.30 
The change in the perception of women is a radical implication of the training of our per-
ception due to changes in societal order and an example of an appearance of the political. When 
such an implication is revealed to also be a means of oppression it would be classified as an ide-
ology, i.e. as a set of ideas in the service of a particular balance of interests and powers using in-
struments, such as witch-hunting, for maintaining them. Witch-hunting belongs to the past, but 
it demonstrates how far-reaching the consequences of changes in society are for our perception 
of it. Even though witch-hunting is a closed chapter in Western history, past chapters often have 
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an influence on what follows. Federici makes aware how the end of most witch-hunting did not 
imply an end to legal processes against women but only a change of content.31 We can, and 
should, ask how the heritage of witch-hunting is still present in contemporary views on women. 
b. Another example is how perception is formed in and by the social environment in 
what is discussed as aesthetic economy. For a characterisation of aesthetic economy I will in-
clude what Hannah Arendt describes as a change in perception of labour. She makes a distinc-
tion between labour and work where labour relates to the basic, physical necessities of life, to 
reproduction and to what is consumed to maintain life. Work, on the other hand, is concerned 
with what is unnatural, with the artificial things we make.32 Labour consists of both reproduction 
and production. When reproductive labour falls outside of a monetary economy, as was the case 
in early modern times, it loses value.33 With the later development of the modern capitalism of 
today the household is included in the economy, taken care of by “the entertainment industry, 
fast food and convenience food, tourism and professional childcare.”34Household inclusion must 
be seen as a consequence of capitalism characterised as a system of needs; the inclusion answers 
also the decisive characteristic of capitalism, growth, by expanding into what was before not in-
cluded into the economy. However, we must, as Hannah Arendt points out, explain how it is 
possible to have an increase in consuming beyond the necessities for sustaining life.35 
Especially in Critical Theory the late development of capitalism has been discussed and 
Böhme has recently contributed with his Critique of Aesthetic Capitalism.36 He relates to, among 
more, Wolfgang Fritz Haug’s discussion of consumer aesthetics, where Haug argues that the illu-
sions commodities give people are to an extent where “[a]ny other world, different from that 
provided by the commodities, is almost no longer accessible to them.”37 These illusions are what 
Haug and Böhme point at as an answer of how consuming grows beyond our needs. A character-
istic of capitalism today is, as Marcuse quotes from Marx (from Grundrisse) that “the level of 
needs has been developed to the degree where surplus labor over and above work for the necessi-
ties has itself become a universal need generated by the individual needs themselves.”38 An im-
portant point in understanding contemporary capitalism, Böhme emphasises, is that we cannot 
understand it solely as a system of needs, as needs will reach a fulfilment; continuing growth 
must be explained in term of desire as desires, when met, are increased.39 
The change from a system of needs to a system of desires also includes the question of 
public and private discussed above. Needs can be seen as belonging to the public domain as we 
can collectively largely agree on what the needs to satisfy are in a society. Of course there are 
individual variations, but if anyone has excessive needs it is the collective norm they are judged 
to be excessive in relation to. Desires on the other hand relate to individual differences to what 
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are largely private matters. That desires can be influenced to an extent where they can explain 
growth in economy is an example of how deeply we, as sensorial and bodily beings, are formed 
by different means of influencing us. 
In section 2 I suggested Marcuse’s radical sensibility in response to Sartwell; concern-
ing the influence of society on our perception, this response can be seen as an aesthetic aspect 
of what we read in Marx’ studies of Hegel, that “It is not the consciousness of men that deter-
mines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.”40 Marcu-
se’s possible answer to how the education of such radical sensibility can come about is, very 
briefly, drawing on Sigmund Freud and his idea of two fundamental principles, the pleasure 
and reality principles, where the reality principle appears as a means of limiting an unlimited 
pleasure principle that strives for satisfaction of instinctual needs beyond what the world can 
provide; “the pleasure principle is incompatible with reality, and the instincts have to undergo 
a repressive regimentation.”41 When the reality of the world is scarcity it could have been com-
pensated or answered through distributing goods in accordance with individuals’ needs; in-
stead scarcity has, along with efforts of overcoming it through work, been imposed upon indi-
viduals, implying an element of domination. Forms of this repression are what characterises 
the different forms of the reality principle appearing in institutions, laws, and values for exam-
ple. Reality and pleasure principles find their emphatic appearances in civilization and sexuali-
ty when for instance the pleasure principle is reinterpreted and sexual impulses then become 
restricted to the reproduction in the nuclear family.42 
This description is an oversimplification and Marcuse points at a complex of reality 
principles which add specific forms of domination denoting surplus-repression. As a possible 
answer to how desire has become fundamental for our consumer society one element is of par-
ticular interest; it is what he calls a performance principle (Leistungsprinzip).43 Our perfor-
mances are through labour, but labour is mainly related to an apparatus the individuals have 
no control of and their needs are not satisfied through work, and work without gratification 
becomes painful. Due to a world-interpretation of the rationality of the work-life that condi-
tions our material welfare a self-imposed repression appears. Work-life is compensated 
through leisure time, the free time granting moments of happiness. In particular the enter-
tainment industry plays an essential role in filling leisure time with narratives reproducing the 
world-interpretation of rational life and material welfare.44 
To answer the question of how modern capitalism’s continuing growth is possible Haug 
and Marcuse hence suggest how desires are fundamental and formed by society to become the 
fundamental drive of a consumer-based capitalism. While Böhme is in agreement about the 
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fundamental importance of desires he criticises their false conflict between true values of use 
and the superfluous and manipulative elements of aesthetics, which increase the exchange val-
ue. For Böhme the aesthetic is no mere superfluous addition but a use value of social im-
portance that he calls staging value.45 Böhme’s critique can be questioned but he makes a point 
that it throws light on what is implied in a radical sensibility, to borrow the term from Marcu-
se. It characterises the training of our perception through the environment in which particular 
structures of power appear. 
 
4. Approaching Political Aesthetics 
I have characterised aesthetic education to be about training our perception, which is an essen-
tial step in learning how to relate to other people and different situations. Aesthetic education 
is not the refinement of specific skills such as knowing how to judge aesthetic works of art, but 
a step towards the formation (Bildung) of the spirit to become a moral being. This education 
has traditionally been through an active sensorial and bodily participation like learning to 
dance and play music, as I gave in examples above; it is also the participatory, in relation to for 
instance film and literature that engage our senses and emotions. Through such participation 
we do not only learn what to perceive, we also learn how to perceive. Furthermore, education 
is not limited to specific situations which we would think of as learning-situations such as edu-
cational institutions; it concerns all of our involvement with the environment making us sub-
ject to influences from social and physical interactions. In any of these relations we are en-
gaged in and subject to structures of powers. Being permanently exposed and subject to 
elements of power forming us, and being permanently engaged with them in ways where we 
also maintain and reproduce them, motivates a political aesthetics that focuses on the training 
of our sensorial cognition by the political structures we are part of to become aware of the po-
litical dimensions hidden within. 
The examples given have hopefully established both how fundamental the hidden polit-
ical dimensions are and also how comprehensive they are when they concern our relation to 
anything we do—not only specific situations. Often, we are not aware of how deeply embedded 
in political structures we are, and even if we are aware, we have little possibility of acting dif-
ferent. We know very well we are affected by the environment, by advertising and media, by 
work-life and leisure products, by people and design. However, it is difficult to choose to act 
differently in relation to these matters, and there is also the question of to what extent acting 
different is possible if this is not about choices of relations to people, work and consuming but 
about how we perceive anything. 
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However, being strongly influenced is not the same as saying we are determined. An essen-
tial step to take here is to become aware of the mechanisms of the influences we are subject to. 
This is also the reason for moving on from Sartwell to Marcuse’s radical sensitivity and similar 
critical approaches to how we are aesthetically educated through our engagement with the envi-
ronment. I will draw attention to one very influential element in this education: popular culture. 
Popular culture plays a very prominent role because of our fascination with it. Even if 
we try to keep a distance and insist on not adhering to all kinds of messages conveyed non-stop 
through popular culture we will find it very difficult not to be subject to at least some influence 
as it forms the common discourse of society we are participating in. Not only as a matter of 
references that we could at least notice and actively distance ourselves from, but also through 
language and modes of expressions that we use for interpretation to become influential and 
even dominating in how we talk about and consequently see things. We can here think of met-
aphors which currently, in the second decade of the 21st century, often come from a monetary 
world and sports making us describe many activities as investing, profiting, performing, and 
winning. The performance principle introduced by Marcuse in the 1970s seems to be even 
more to the point today. 
Views on popular culture differ as to whether it should be seen as a potential liberating 
force or a means for maintaining and upholding specific structures. The transformative power 
of popular culture is a point made by Richard Shusterman who gives 1960s rock music as an 
example: “Rock music has long been carrier of covert messages. Emerging as it did from condi-
tions of social and cultural oppression, rock’s complex levels of meaning [. . .] enable it to dis-
semble its message of protest with a guise of innocuous mindlessness.”46 
In opposition to this we have critique insisting that the progressive and emancipatory 
elements are only seemingly so, only translating rather than transforming cultural patterns. 
Transformative power is not only disguised as innocuous here but may turn out to be in fact 
innocuous, even prove to be itself a veil over the appropriation of an independent (sub or coun-
ter) culture transformed into entertainment for consumers. This is what Marcuse writes hap-
pened when black music was appropriated by white people to become music performed in an 
organized space—for an audience in the form of a concert or recorded music. The outcome he 
calls totalitarian “in the way in which it overwhelms individual consciousness and mobilizes a 
collective unconscious which remains without social foundation.”47 The possible emancipation 
within the music and the cultural protest remains at the surface, giving the illusion of libera-
tion, but it is no liberation for the community or of the spirit. “Liberation remains a private 
affair.”48 In the end such illusions return and form our perceptions because, as Haug writes, 
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commodities give “the people a sense of meaningfulness” and they provide “them with a lan-
guage to interpret their existence in the world.”49 
Marcuse’s critique that rock music has moved out of a cultural foundation in black peo-
ple’s experiences that are lived again in music and become an object of entertainment and aes-
thetic judgement is similar to the concern of Gadamer about aesthetic consciousness men-
tioned above. Music is enjoyed and judged for its qualities in relation to a set of criteria of what 
good music is while its cultural origin or the experiences to learn from within it have been lost. 
Or, we should say, the experiences have been transformed into a culture of entertainment and 
consumption of music that calls for a reflection on this transformation, but such reflection lies 
outside these products. The music as well as other popular cultural products may convey mes-
sages, also messages with a political critical content or at least a content that changes our per-
ception of for instance social issues like gender roles and sexuality, but they hardly convey a 
message about their own embeddedness into a political and ideological order. Sub and counter 
cultural movements often find they are appropriated by popular culture and transformed into 
something which loses their motives and experiences. 
The example of popular culture is meant to draw attention to how a particular organisa-
tion of the world, the one of aesthetic economy where desire and consume are main character-
istics, implies also taking possession of our lives, forming us to adhere to these interests. They 
define and distribute powers and ideas of human relations and existence and engage us by 
forming our senses and body, hence our perception and way of thinking. The political then 
appears in how we perceive for instance privacy, gender roles, and our emotions and desires. 
Such studies are conducted in different contexts and my suggestion of a political aesthetics is 
to point out a common focus here and to emphasise aesthetics as a field of interest when we 
understand aesthetics in relation to Baumgarten’s sensorial cognition. 
One focus is to investigate the foundation and legitimacy of our perception, a study ex-
ercised particularly in relation to phenomenology which I above said I relate to without devel-
oping further. The phenomenological approach questions how we characterise perception and 
investigates “how this setting, which acts as a background to every act of consciousness, comes 
to be constituted.”50 A dominant idea of perception is that it is object-oriented and Böhme in-
vites us to consider whether we instead should begin with the presence of something for which 
he then uses the term atmosphere as a key-concept for both perception and aesthetics.51 The 
critical potential of such an investigation is to question the structures by which we perceive 
and consequently interpret as well as reproduce specific patterns in our relation to the envi-
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ronment. The question here is not so much what we perceive, the specific elements we can 
identify as embedded in different ideologies, but how we perceive. 
Political aesthetics may benefit from drawing on more works from different fields, add-
ing to phenomenology inspiration from Critical Theory which I have used here—an iconic text 
in this tradition is Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion.52 He addresses how perception is determined by historical forms and changes in human 
existence. From other traditions in philosophy Wolfgang Welsch makes aware how we must 
distinguish between sense-perception (Sinneswahrnehmung) and making sense of that which 
is perceived (Sinnwahrnehmung) while also paying attention to how both forms are related in 
a sensuous influence on thought-processes.53 When perception and thinking is kept together, 
and this can now open a philosophical debate between traditions that keep them together and 
others that do not, it is clear the consequences of forming perception through our engagement 
in the environment are far-reaching. Again, this makes aesthetics a central topic when, as Ar-
nold Berleant characterises it, it “rests on sensory perception together with the personal and 
cultural factors that affects perception.”54 In discussion of Welsch and also Jacques Rancière55 
about an aesthetic politics Berleant speaks of a “perceptual commons”56 which is the common 
perceptual sphere we live in and share with others. This brings back the question of our rela-
tion as individuals to the common and social, the key-issue of education and formation, which 
is a direction to take for aesthetics requiring attention directed57 towards the political elements 
already present in how perception is formed when we not only set out on a journey towards 
formation of spirit, but ask what to do at the beginning. 
Political aesthetics offers a first step of characterising the field of our relation to and in-
terpretation of the environment, asking for an awareness of how comprehensively we are 
formed by it and to understand then the importance of a critical investigation of perception as 
provided by aesthetics. We should distance ourselves from aesthetics concerned with charac-
terising a specific field of objects and relations to these objects expressed in appreciation and 
similar characteristics of art as well as objects of the everyday. Instead, we should ask what 
objects signify and do to us beyond determining what they are and can be used for. Required is 
that we see the ideological elements embedded in the environment, ask for the implications of 
them, and the legitimacy of our usual ways of dealing with them, as we otherwise maintain 
those structures of power we should become aware of. 
 
I would like to thank the reviewers and editors, in particular Olivia Glasser, for many im-
portant and substantial comments and Coral McDonnell for help with the language. 
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